Why does the U.S. classification system produce so many withheld records that the secrecy itself tells us little about what is actually being hidden?

Humanity · 2026-10-17

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Question

Why does the U.S. classification system produce so many withheld records that the secrecy itself tells us little about what is actually being hidden?

Assumption tested

The standard version holds that sealed records around JFK, Vietnam, and UFOs prove governments are hiding the truth. The narrower, less-told angle is that this secrecy is mostly a bureaucratic default — 50 million classification decisions a year, 90% of which are probably unnecessary — so the real question is not what is hidden but why the system makes overclassification the path of least resistance.

Best case FOR

The CIA's Mexico City station history is an essential document in the JFK collection. The National Security Archive stated on October 1, 2026 that "The CIA continues to keep secret major substantive portions" of an internal accounting of its activities in Mexico. The 539-page history was requested by the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978, and the CIA initially refused before supplying only 227 pages. It has undergone five additional declassification reviews since 2017 and still contains major redactions. The most significant are pages 331 through 341, which "appear to deal with student operations."

Material related to the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco was not declassified until more than 50 years later.

Best case AGAINST

That incentive structure makes caution the default.

Former President Obama said in 2016 that much classified material presented to the president or secretary of state is "basically stuff that you could get in open source."

The system's backlog is enormous. Yet mandatory declassification review — where the public can request specific documents — results in "more than 90 percent of requested documents" being declassified.

The 9/11 Commission Report warned in 2004 that "current security requirements nurture overclassification." The bipartisan Moynihan report concluded that "secrecy is reduced overall" is the way to protect secrets most effectively.

The National Archives released nearly 80,000 documents in 2025, unredacted. The March 18, 2025 release alone included 31,419 pages. A further 11,022 pages followed on January 30, 2026.

Incentives

In this case, the sources show that overclassification has invisible consequences while underclassification can end a career.

The Brennan Center notes that "the ratio of declassification spending to classification spending has decreased dramatically" in recent years, so the system spends far more on keeping secrets than on releasing them.

In this case, the CIA's continued redaction of the Mexico City station history — even after a presidential directive — suggests that FOIA exemptions give agencies a durable legal path to keep material out.

Historical anchor

Agency records were collected between 1994 and 1998 and reviewed by an independent Assassination Records Review Board. The collection includes over 5 million pages housed at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.

In 1978, the House Select Committee on Assassinations requested the CIA's three-volume, 539-page Mexico City station history. The CIA initially refused, then supplied 227 pages. Those excerpts entered the JFK collection.

Yet the Mexico City station history — reviewed five times since 2017 — remains partially withheld as of the October 1, 2026 National Security Archive statement.

What we don't know

We do not know what is on pages 331 through 341 of the Mexico City station history. The National Security Archive says they "appear to deal with student operations," but the content remains classified.

We do not know whether the CIA's continued withholding is driven by a genuine concern about sources and methods, or by institutional inertia and embarrassment.

What would change our mind

If the fully unredacted Mexico City station history were released and contained nothing beyond standard intelligence-protection language — sources, methods, living identities — that would strongly support the "bureaucratic default" view.

If pages 331-341 contained specific operational details that would change the accepted account of the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre or the JFK investigation, that would support the "concealment" view.

If the Pentagon's ACME AI pilot demonstrably reduced overclassification in a measurable way, it would show the problem is fixable through process rather than requiring a cultural revolution.

So what

In this case, the sources suggest the secrecy surrounding major historical events looks less like a conspiracy than like a system where the safest bureaucratic choice may be to classify first and declassify never.

WHAT IF?

DOCUMENTED GAP: Pages 331 through 341 of the CIA's Mexico City station history remain redacted despite Executive Order 14176 and five declassification reviews since 2017. The National Security Archive states they "appear to deal with student operations."

HYPOTHESIS A — PARTLY SUPPORTED: If the redactions hide material evidence of U.S. covert operations against student groups before the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre, we would expect the released pages to name specific operations, funding streams, or personnel involved in harassment or surveillance of student groups. A 1967 CIA internal note cited by the National Security Archive — "a Station militant action team for specific harassment purposes" — is consistent with this. Kill condition: release of pages 331-341 showing only source-protection redactions, with no operational detail that would change the accepted account of the massacre or the JFK investigation. What would support it: release showing specific operational details, funding, or personnel linked to student groups.

HYPOTHESIS B — TESTABLE-UNSUPPORTED: If the redactions protect sources, methods, or ongoing operations, the content would be consistent with standard intelligence-protection language found in other declassified documents. Kill condition: release of pages 331-341 showing operational details that could compromise assets or ongoing operations, which would support Hypothesis A over B. What would support it: release showing only source names, method descriptions, or living identities with no operational detail.

DOCUMENTED GAP: The U.S. government makes 50 million classification decisions a year. No independent audit cited in the available sources confirms the 90% figure.

HYPOTHESIS A — PARTLY SUPPORTED: If a large share of classification decisions is driven by bureaucratic caution rather than genuine national security need, we would expect independent audits to find high rates of overclassification, and for reform efforts to focus on incentives rather than law. The ClearanceJobs analysis of career risk for underclassification, Obama's comment that much classified material is "basically stuff that you could get in open source," and the Moynihan report's call to reduce secrecy overall all support this. Kill condition: an independent audit finding that most classifications are justified by specific, identifiable threats. What would support it: an audit finding that a majority of classifications lack a specific, identifiable threat justification.

HYPOTHESIS B — TESTABLE-UNSUPPORTED: If the 50 million figure is misleading because many classification decisions are low-stakes but required by statute or regulation, reform would require changing laws and regulations, not just culture. Kill condition: a legislative analysis showing that a majority of classification decisions are statutorily mandated rather than discretionary. What would support it: a legislative analysis showing that most classifications are required by existing law.

What you can do today

Individuals

Groups

Organizations

  • Publish independent analysis of mandatory declassification review success rates to document overclassification patterns.
  • Incorporate declassified JFK records into educational curricula to teach historical research with primary sources.

Officials

  • Commission an independent audit of annual classification decisions to verify the overclassification rate claim.
  • Mandate annual reporting of agency declassification versus classification spending ratios for oversight.
    Links: NARA Reports (archives.gov)

Take it further

More: All resources

Links come from automated search and curated lists and were checked for availability on 2026-10-28. They are listed for relevance, not endorsement.

Glossary

  • Mandatory declassification review: A legal process allowing anyone to request review of classified documents for release
  • FOIA exemptions: Specific categories allowing agencies to withhold information from Freedom of Information Act requests
  • Overclassification: The practice of marking more information classified than national security requires
  • Sources and methods: Intelligence terminology for how information is gathered and the people who provide it
  • Assassination Records Review Board: Independent board that reviewed and released JFK assassination records
  • Executive Order 14176: Presidential directive governing classification and declassification policies nationwide
  • Brennan Center: Nonpartisan law and policy institute focused on democracy and justice issues
  • ACME AI pilot: Pentagon program testing artificial intelligence for classification and declassification decisions
  • Institutional inertia: Tendency of organizations to resist change and continue existing practices
  • Underclassification: Failure to classify information that genuinely requires protection for national security

Sources

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